Public Statements by State Authorities Through the Lens of the Presumption of Innocence: Current ECtHR Approaches

The presumption of innocence, the prototype of which took shape as far back as Roman criminal procedure and was first enshrined in Article 9 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, is a fundamental principle of criminal justice. In practice, however, this principle is often breached through disproportionate actions by representatives of the state. While the aim of such intervention may be to inform the public, Article 6 § 2 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms expressly prohibits officials from making premature statements as to a person's guilt. As early as 1983, in Minelli v. Switzerland (application no. 8660/79), the European Court of Human Rights established the position that 'the presumption of innocence will be violated if, without the accused's having previously been proved guilty … a judicial decision concerning him reflects an opinion that he is guilty.' This standard not only remains relevant today but has been further developed in the Court's case-law in recent years.

The Duty of Restraint of Officials in the Public Sphere

An important aspect of the presumption of innocence is the duty of public officials to exercise restraint in their public statements.

In its 2026 judgment in Kaya v. Belgium (application no. 10089/18), the ECtHR found a violation of Article 6 § 2 on account of an interview given by a labour inspector to a financial newspaper. Although the case was at the appeal stage, the representative of the state body called the applicant a 'cunning fraudster who knows all the tricks of the trade.' The Court stressed that, while the authorities are entitled to inform the public about investigations, they must do so 'with all the discretion and circumspection necessary if the presumption of innocence is to be respected.' Moreover, officials must choose their words carefully when referring to a person whose guilt has not been established by a final court verdict.

Accordingly, any public statement that leads the public to believe in a person's guilt before the verdict has become final amounts to a violation of human rights.

The Status of Third Parties in Proceedings Against Accomplices

The problem of premature findings of guilt arises in verdicts concerning accomplices that mention persons whose cases are being heard separately. In Achtypi v. Greece (application no. 58669/19), the national court, in its verdict concerning an accomplice, expressly referred to the existence of 'intent' on the part of the applicant herself, even though the criminal proceedings against her had been discontinued on limitation grounds.

In its 2026 judgment, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court concluded that, while courts may describe the involvement of third parties where this is necessary to assess the guilt of the defendant, they must avoid providing more information than is required. In this case, establishing the applicant's personal 'intent' was not legally necessary to convict the other individual as an instigator, and the wording used did not merely describe a 'state of suspicion' but in fact asserted that the applicant had committed a criminal offence.

Similarly, in Blaško v. Slovakia (application no. 50301/22), the national court approved a plea agreement with the applicant's former accomplice. In the text of that decision, the applicant was referred to as a person who had directly purchased narcotic substances, without any indication that his case had been severed into separate proceedings or that his guilt had not yet been proven.

In its judgment of 9 April 2026 in this case, the ECtHR emphasised that 'the court made no proper reference to the fact that separate proceedings were pending against the applicant, or that the court's sole task was to assess the criminal liability of his accomplice within the case.' Therefore, since statements by judges are subject to stricter scrutiny than those of other authorities, there had been a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.

At the same time, K.O. v. Germany (application no. 16678/22) illustrates an approach under which detailed descriptions of a third party's actions are not regarded as a violation. The German courts referred to the applicant as a 'separately prosecuted person' (gesondert Verfolgter) and expressly noted that the question of his guilt (Schuld) was not being decided in those proceedings. The ECtHR found that, in such circumstances, there had been no breach of the presumption of innocence, since references to the involvement of third parties may be indispensable for assessing the guilt of those standing trial.

The Presumption of Innocence After Discontinuation of Criminal Proceedings

The issue of the presumption of innocence remains relevant even after criminal proceedings have been discontinued, for instance on formal grounds. In Episcopo and Bassani v. Italy (applications nos. 47284/16 and 84604/17), the criminal proceedings were discontinued on limitation grounds. The appellate court applied confiscation of assets as 'proceeds of crime,' which, as a 'security measure' (misura di sicurezza), may be imposed even after a case has been discontinued. At the same time, in its decision the court noted that 'the evidence can only confirm the conclusion as to Mr Episcopo's responsibility for the criminal charges brought against him.'

The violation of the presumption of innocence lay in the fact that such statements contained an assertion of the person's guilt, despite the absence of a verdict owing to the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings.

The Use of Facts in Civil and Administrative Proceedings

It is important to distinguish between establishing guilt as an element of a criminal offence and the factual assessment of events in an administrative or civil context. In Vekua v. Georgia (application no. 43537/22), the administrative courts annulled the applicant's title to land because, in criminal proceedings that had been discontinued on limitation grounds, it had been established that the registration document was forged. The applicant complained that, by doing so, the administrative court had effectively found her to be a person guilty of fraud, even though there had been no conviction.

In its 2026 judgment in this case, the ECtHR held that there had been no breach of the presumption of innocence. The Court explained that the administrative courts had merely established the fact of the document's unlawfulness, not the person's guilt in the criminal proceedings. Thus, 'the protection afforded by Article 6 § 2 … should not be interpreted as preventing the national courts in other proceedings … from engaging with the facts established in criminal proceedings, provided they do not decide the question of criminal liability.'

Moreover, a different standard of proof applies in administrative proceedings, and a finding of 'the unlawfulness of an act' is not equivalent to a finding of 'guilt of a crime.' Accordingly, the Court found no violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.

A similar approach by the Court can be seen in Uygun v. Türkiye (application no. 9389/19), where a prison disciplinary board refused to send the applicant's letter because its content 'implied' an active role in a terrorist organisation. The Court held that the term 'to imply' reflected a degree of caution and was not a direct assertion of guilt, and therefore the limits of the presumption of innocence had been respected.

The Burden of Proof and the Presumption of Innocence

Finally, the conduct of the trial itself must also comply with this principle. This is illustrated by Karakasidis v. Greece (application no. 46737/20). The judgment describes a situation in which, during a search of the applicant's car, the police found a box of jewellery. The applicant claimed that the items belonged to his wife, but the court found him guilty of concealing property obtained through crime solely on the ground that he had failed to prove the lawful origin of the jewellery.

The ECtHR held that there had been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention, since the national courts had effectively shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defence. The Court emphasised that the obligation to prove the unlawful origin of property lies with the prosecution. Accordingly, the proposition that an accused must disprove his own guilt directly contradicts the principle of the presumption of innocence.

Conclusions

Thus, the ECtHR's case-law for 2024–2026 confirms that the presumption of innocence requires representatives of the state to display not only procedural correctness but also particular restraint in their terminology during public or official statements. An analysis of the judgments shows that a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention is found whenever officials — particularly prosecutors and judges — use evaluative terms, directly impute guilt after a case has been discontinued on limitation grounds, or shift the burden of proof onto the defence. At the same time, the Court leaves the authorities the possibility of informing the public, provided that neutral descriptions are used and excessive information about accomplices whose guilt has not yet been established by a verdict is avoided. The key criterion remains whether the statement creates in the public a belief in the person's guilt before a verdict is delivered: if a public official goes beyond describing a 'state of suspicion' and presents the person as a criminal, the right to a fair trial is considered to have been violated. Thus, respecting the presumption of innocence in 2024–2026 requires the state authorities to strike a careful balance between society's right to information and the duty to respect the innocence of every person.

Anastasiia Savchuk, Junior Associate at LCF Law Group, exclusively for Liga.Zakon.